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This paper aims to investigate the impact of reforms on economic growth in a sam-
ple of transition economies of Central Eastern Europe, South Eastern Europe and 
Commonwealth of Independent States from 1989 until 2010. We employ a panel 
data methodology and run a Haussman test to distinguish between a fixed effect and 
a random effect model. In addition, we take into account the role of reform reversals 
and examine their contribution in the growth dynamics. Reform downgrades are 
very common since in some cases progress in reforms has been stalled or even re-
versed due to political instability, wars, economic crises, etc. We model the reforms 
downgrades following the previous work of Merlevede (2003) using a different 
methodology and extending our period of estimation. Furthermore, the relationship 
between other explanatory variables (i.e. initial conditions, fiscal balance) and 
growth is further explored in the empirical estimation. 
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The fall of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of the Former Soviet Union marked 
an important historical moment following the break up from the old socialist sys-
tem and necessitated the creation of new democratic institutions and the transfor-
mation of the economy. The communist legacy had left economies of the Central 
Eastern Europe (CEE), South Eastern Europe (SEE) and Commonwealth of Inde-
pendent States (CIS) with huge distortions in their initial starting positions, macro-
economic development and reforms. At the outset of transition, these countries 
faced large discrepancies in their output growth profiles. A relevant stylized feature 
in transition concerned the massive output fall soon after the adoption of the initial 
reforms and stabilization programs. Beside the initial output decline, other crucial 
factors which became part of this huge economic transformation involved a capital 
shrink, labor movement and trade reorientation, the change of economic structure, 
institutional collapse and an increase in transition costs (Campos and Coricelli, 
2002).  
This paper aims to investigate the impact of reforms on economic growth in a 
sample of transition economies of Central Eastern Europe, South Eastern Europe 
and Commonwealth of Independent States from 1989 until 2010. We employ a pan-
el data methodology and run a Haussman test to distinguish between a fixed effect 
and a random effect model. For the sake of comparison, transition economies are 
divided into three groups according to their regional belonging. In addition, we take 
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into account the role of reform reversals and examine their contribution in the 
growth dynamics. Reform downgrades are very common since in some cases pro-
gress in reforms has been stalled or even reversed due to political instability, wars, 
economic crises, etc. We model the reforms downgrades following the previous 
work of Merlevede (2003) using a different methodology and extending our period 
of estimation. Furthermore, the relationship between other explanatory variables 
(i.e. initial conditions, fiscal balance) and growth is further explored in the empirical 
estimation.  
Our main finding reveals a negative contemporaneous relationship of reforms 
on economic growth followed by a positive lagged effect in the latter periods. This 
finding is consistent with the preceding works of Falcetti et. al (2002), Falcetti et. al 
(2006), Merlevede (2003), etc.  Macroeconomic stabilization represented by the 
fiscal balance is found out to be positively related to growth. We conclude that the 
larger the magnitude of reform reversals, the larger is its impact on output growth, 
though they are not found to be statistically significant in our model. Lastly, we re-
port that the negative impact of a reversal on growth is bigger whenever a country 
has achieved a higher score in the reform index. 
The thesis is structured as follows. Chapter II discusses the literature review fo-
cusing on the role of initial conditions, reforms and macroeconomic policies and 
their impact on output performance in transition economies. Additionally, a special 
subsection of this chapter is dedicated to the study of reform reversals and main 
reform strategies arising in the empirical literature. Chapter III focuses on nailing 
down the main reasons of the output decline from the most influential theoretical 
models. Chapter IV explains the macroeconomic performance of transition econo-
mies from the early years until the latest periods. Chapter V presents the hypothe-
ses that will be tested in our empirical model. Chapter VI exhibits the methodology 
used in the empirical estimation, the data that will be employed and the main re-
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The empirical literature of growth determinants in transi-
tion economies 
Transition economies have experienced a substantial variation in the output per-
formance over the last 20 years. These countries shared a set of common character-
istics and differences which are largely reported in the literature. The transitory 
phase from planned to a market economy was associated initially with large output 
declines followed afterwards by periods of recovery and prosperity. Macroeconom-
ic fundamentals were shaken and inflation rates increased sharply at the outset of 
transition. Stabilization programs were adopted to settle down the inflation rates 
and to ensure a steady path of output growth.  
There exists a broad consensus among researchers when it comes to determine 
some key explanatory variables which commonly influence output fluctuations in 
transition economies. Usually, from a broad category of factors emerging from the 
empirical literature, much more attention has been paid to initial conditions varia-
bles, macroeconomic policies and reforms.  
Initial conditions included all those specific economic characteristics which were 
unique to each single country during the communist period before they shifted to-
ward democratic regimes at the beginning of the 90’s. Different transition econo-
mies had different starting positions in terms of their income per capita, output 
growth, macroeconomic development, natural resources, industrialization, devel-
opment of market institutions etc. Macroeconomic policies aimed at lowering infla-
tion rates and reducing the fiscal deficits throughout the adoption of sound mone-
13 
 
tary and fiscal reforms. Lastly, market reforms implemented in a large number of 
economic areas are considered to be important growth determinants (EBRD Transi-
tion Report, 2004).  
2.1 Initial conditions and economic growth  
Several empirical papers have investigated the impact of initial conditions on 
economic growth, but the degree of interdependence varies in different studies and 
is more or less subject to controversy. Nevertheless, it is generally accepted that ini-
tial conditions have affected output growth in a significant manner, at least in the 
early transition period. On the other hand, few studies have estimated that the role 
of the initial conditions has diminished throughout the transition period and other 
variables have gained more importance in the late transition years.  
De Melo et al. (2001) were among the first to investigate the role of initial condi-
tions on economic growth.  A comprehensive index representing initial conditions 
was constructed by De Melo et al. (2001) employing principal component analysis. 
They identified 11 variables which represented initial conditions and characterized 
the economies in transition prior to their transformation into market economies. 
The first two principal components were given more importance since they cap-
tured most of the variation in initial conditions and represented specifically the lev-
el of macroeconomic and structural distortions in transition economies. 
 OLS regressions suggested a negative relationship among initial conditions and 
output performance. These findings showed that countries which had a higher de-
gree of macroeconomic distortions and economic development were associated 
with lower growth rates. Moreover, the level of macroeconomic distortions exerted 
a negative impact on the liberalization index thus delaying the reform implementa-
tion process. On the contrary, a positive relationship between average liberalization 
rates and the level of structural distortions was observed, indicating that transition 
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economies with a higher level of development were able to implement more re-
forms (De Melo et. al, 2001).  
Additionally, De Melo et. al (2001) tried to examine the explanatory power and 
relative impact of liberalization measures, initial conditions and political reforms. It 
was observed that economic policies played a crucial role in explaining output per-
formance, while the impact of initial conditions was estimated to be smaller com-
pared to reforms.   
Krueger and Ciolko (1998) also discussed the impact of initial conditions on 
economic growth of transition economies. They emphasized the differences arising 
in the economic development of CEE and FSU countries under centrally planned 
economic systems. Countries of Central Europe like Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and 
Poland had a substantial degree of openness compared to Former Soviet Union 
countries. They were able to liberalize their internal markets and establish trade 
relations with some of the Western countries due to their geographical proximity, 
culture and other factors which may have influenced their output performance at 
the outset of transition. As such, two proxies were used to capture the contribution 
of initial conditions on the growth performance of transition economies. The share 
of total exports of GDP in 1989 and the level of GNP per capita in 1988 were used as 
measures of initial conditions. In the empirical estimation using OLS, it was ob-
served that the share of exports as of 1989 was positively related to output fluctua-
tions between 1989 and 1995. Meanwhile, the GNP per capita in 1988 negatively 
affected growth performance.  
In support of these studies, Berg et al. (1999) and Heybey and Murrell (1999)  
argued that initial conditions and macroeconomic variables were responsible for 
the initial output decline in these economies finding no relevant support for the im-
pact of structural policies on output performance at the beginning of the transition 
period. Initial conditions significantly affected the output growth and were seen as 
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important drivers of output growth at the start of transition period. However, the 
role of initial conditions seemed to have been diminished and replaced by structural 
policies which were responsible for the output variations in the later transition pe-
riod ( Berg et. al).  
In Heybey and Murrell (1999), initial conditions were represented by the share 
of trade exports as a percentage of GDP and the average GDP level before the im-
plementation of the reforms in the transition economies. Their data set comprised 
26 countries of the Central Eastern Europe, Former Soviet Union and Mongolia and 
the time span considered as a starting period the beginning of the reform process.    
Using the same proxies of initial conditions as in De Melo et al. (2001), 
Havrylyshyn et al. (1998) confirmed the negative effects of inherited distortions on 
the output performance of transition economies and their diminishing role with the 
passing of time. Initial conditions prevailed over reforms during the first years of 
transition, but their effect diminished over time as more countries from the Former 
Soviet Union were growing faster compared to Central Eastern European econo-
mies despite their unfavorable starting positions. Adverse initial conditions could 
be easily overcome with the implementation of more reforms.  
An important finding documented in Eicher & Schreiber (2010) , which con-
trasts previous studies, suggests that the role of initial conditions is not diminished 
through time. However, when trying to relate initial conditions with the structural 
policies, the interaction term remains insignificant. These results stressed out the 
importance of structural reforms on growth more than the impact of initial condi-
tions suggesting that countries can successfully achieve higher growth levels de-
spite their initial starting positions.  
Cerovic & Nojkovic (2009) calculated progress made in transition economies 
considering the accomplishment of reforms and found out that transition is an en-
during process which has not yet come to an end as it was expected in the early 
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transition years. The long-lasting transition experience is closely related to initial 
conditions which have a strong influence on reforms and economic growth and 
seem to dominate even in the second part of the transition period. As such, good ini-
tial conditions provide a favorable and attractive environment to sustain implemen-
tation of fast reforms and achieve high growth rates. Poor performance of some 
economies in transition is explained by their inability to overcome inherited distor-
tions despite the introduction of speedy liberalization measures.  
2.2 Reforms, stabilization policies and output growth   
In the empirical literature, reforms or liberalization policies have a significant con-
tribution in explaining the diverse growth experiences in Central Eastern Europe 
and Former Soviet Union. A considerable bulk of studies has demonstrated the ben-
eficial impact of reforms on growth. Despite the methodological shortcomings, 
endogeneity issues and the subjectivity of reform indices, most of the researchers 
agree on the negative short-term impact of liberalization policies on growth fol-
lowed by a reverse positive effect in the long-run.  
Employing a two stage least squares methodology, De Melo et. al ( 2001) report-
ed that growth was negatively related to the level of contemporaneous liberaliza-
tion but depended positively on the lagged reforms indicator. Nonlinearity in re-
form measures resulted initially in the contraction of output growth followed af-
terwards by an increased growth performance once reforms were implemented (De 
Melo et. al, 2001). Krueger and Ciolko (1998) constructed a cumulative liberaliza-
tion index following the methodology of De Melo et. al ( 2001) and divided transi-
tion economies according to their degree of liberalization where the fast reformers 
had the highest scores on the index. From the empirical investigation, it emerged 
that transition economies which engaged in a large process of reforms implementa-
tion had the capacity to quickly overcome the output contractions present in the 
first transition years.    
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On the contrary, Heybey and Murrell (1999) questioned the validity of the cu-
mulative liberalization index used previously in the empirical literature as an indi-
cator capturing the reform progress in transition. They criticized the use of this in-
dex by De Melo et al. (2001) since it did not represent the policy change from year 
to year and instead they constructed their own measure of reform.  
Berg et. al (1999) analyzed common factors which influenced the transition 
economies but also cross-country differences arising between these economies be-
ing subject to different output paths. Cross country regressions emphasized the 
possibility of fast reforming countries to attain high growth levels despite their ad-
verse initial conditions. Structural reforms have played an important role during the 
phase of recovery. Moreover, the differences arising among Central Eastern Euro-
pean countries and other countries of the Former Soviet Union generally were more 
dependent on the role of policies rather than on initial conditions.  
Havrylyshyn et. al (1998) provided evidence that good macroeconomic policies 
(i.e lower inflation rates) and more structural reforms combined together are a 
necessary requirement for sustaining higher growth rates. Moreover, the contem-
poraneous impact of reforms on growth was found to be negative, while lagged re-
forms positively contributed to growth. 
Falcetti et al. (2002) carried out an empirical study to assess the impact of re-
forms on growth in a sample of 25 economies in transition. The basic set-up em-
ployed GDP growth rates depending on a set of explanatory variables including ini-
tial conditions, a measure of macroeconomic variable (i.e. fiscal policy) and a re-
form index constructed from the EBRD Transition Reports. Cross sectional analysis 
emphasized the presence of endogeneity of reforms to output growth which caused 
biased estimates of reform measures amplifying their positive impact on output 
performance. Panel specifications were designated to capture the role of reforms in 
different countries in transition as well as to address the endogeneity problems 
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arising among reforms and growth. Moreover, the equations were augmented by 
adding an interactive term which combined initial conditions and time trends and 
also including contemporaneous and lagged values of reforms. The accession of dif-
ferent time patterns in the single equation and 3SLS estimates ameliorated the sim-
ultaneity bias by reducing the reform coefficients significantly. Nevertheless, the 
relationship between reforms and growth was nonlinear in the system of equations 
since the contemporaneous index of liberalization was found to be negative fol-
lowed by a reversed positive coefficient of lagged reforms. Empirical evidence im-
plied that reforms did not have an immediate positive impact on output growth in-
fluencing growth performance with one period lag.  
Falcetti et al. (2006) extended the previous research on the topic of reforms and 
growth nexus by including in the empirical analysis institutional variables, taking 
into account possible multicollinearity among different reform measures and the 
feedback effects from growth to reforms. Their contribution compared to previous 
studies lied in the inclusion of some additional explanatory variables such as output 
recovery, oil prices and trade dependence which depart from traditional factors 
used in the empirical literature of economies in transition. The data sample consist-
ed of 25 EBRD economies and the period of estimation extended from 1989-2003. 
Using several methodologies, the empirical results indicated that reforms had a pos-
itive lagged effect on output growth reinforcing the conclusions of earlier studies.   
Babetskii and Campos (2007) conducted a meta-regression analysis (MRA) 
study by making a considerable collection of several econometric techniques that 
were used to explore the reform-growth relationship. They assembled 46 different 
studies and obtained more than 500 estimates that measure the impact of reforms 
on growth. Empirical evidence suggested that the long-term impact of reforms on 
output growth is significant and larger than the short-term effects. Methodology 
shortcomings, type of reforms adopted and time span have to be accounted in the 
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empirical investigation since they seem to bring out the differences of transition 
economies.  
Radulescu & Barlow (2002) used extreme bound analysis to test the contribu-
tion of several explanatory variables found out to be relevant in explaining growth 
dynamics in transition. Inflation was negatively related to output growth and it was 
robust in all empirical specifications. An increase in the budget surplus had a nega-
tive lagged effect on economic performance, while a fixed exchange rate policy posi-
tively led to higher growth rates.  As it has emerged in most of the empirical litera-
ture, reforms are estimated to have a contemporaneous negative impact on growth 
followed by a positive effect with one year lag. However, liberalization efforts did 
not have a robust impact on output growth. The absence of a robust relationship 
between reforms and growth was explained by the existence of subjectivity in the 
construction of reform indices and the failure to account for institutional variables. 
Furthermore, the authors tended to ameliorate the lack of robustness of reforms by 
disentangling the single contribution of each reform component and found out that 
price liberalization, large scale privatization and restructuring had a larger impact 
on growth compared to other reforms. Additionally, the speed of reforms did not 
matter for growth.  
Iradian (2007) tested empirically the contribution of several growth determi-
nants in transition economies providing evidence from the experience of CIS coun-
tries. A large set of explanatory variables combining traditional and new growth fac-
tors accounted for output recovery, investment, macroeconomic stabilization 
measures (inflation rate and fiscal balance), structural policies and institutional re-
forms and other external shocks as major drivers of growth in these economies. 
Empirical investigation indicated that output recovery has negatively influenced 
output growth, while structural reforms and macroeconomic policies targeting low-
er inflation rates and reduced fiscal deficits have improved growth outlook overall. 
Additionally, positive external shocks pertaining to improvements in terms of trade 
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and higher remittances have exerted a positive and significant impact on growth 
performance. Output recovery and external factors are responsible for almost half 
of growth incurred in the later transition period from 2001 up to 2006 in CIS. How-
ever, CIS countries lagged behind in terms of reforms implementation compared to 
CEE economies which were able to introduce more effective structural and institu-
tional reforms. Despite endowment with natural resources of CIS economies, these 
reforms should be addressed especially towards the diversification and investment 
in other sectors of the economy rather than in the oil industry.  
Campos & Horvath (2012) analyzed main reform determinants in a sample of 25 
ex-communist countries by constructing new measures of structural reforms indi-
ces. They have identified significant drawbacks in the methodology employed by 
international organizations in the creation and assembly of reform indices which 
are used in many empirical studies. In order to address properly these methodolog-
ical shortcomings, a reform index focusing on three major reform areas was com-
posed. These indices were referred to as internal liberalization, external liberaliza-
tion, and privatization reforms and regressed over several explanatory variables 
such as output growth, unemployment, democracy and initial conditions. Major 
findings emphasized the significant contribution of output growth on external liber-
alization and privatization reforms, the Herfindal index indicating the concentration 
of power affecting internal liberalization index, and political liberalization (democ-
racy) influencing all the above-mentioned reform dimensions.  
Firdmuc (2002) investigated the impact of economic liberalization and democ-
racy on output performance after the fall of communism considering a sample of 25 
economies of Central Eastern Europe, South Eastern Europe and Former Soviet Un-
ion. He concluded that economic liberalization exerted a positive and significant ef-
fect on economic growth, and it was still reinforced even after controlling for 
endogeneity bias between the liberalization index and economic growth. Overall, 
this study showed that the net impact of democracy in improving the economic out-
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look of the transition economies resulted to be positive. Democracy affected output 
growth indirectly, by speeding up the process of economic liberalization which had 
a direct positive relationship with economic growth. As a result, democracy alone 
was not directly conducive to economic growth, but its combination with the estab-
lishment of market-oriented reforms facilitated the process of development in the 
transition economies. The direction of the causality on the relationship between 
democracy and economic liberalization indicated that democracy influenced eco-
nomic liberalization and not vice versa.  
Fischer et.al (1998) provided a stylized analysis of growth and inflation profiles 
in the initial years of transition and estimated empirically major growth determi-
nants in the short and long run perspective. Average growth rates were dramatical-
ly reduced reaching the bottom level of 41% being particularly more pronounced in 
Former Soviet Union countries were the depth of the recession was higher com-
pared to Central Eastern European economies. Also, inflation rates experienced a 
sharp increase at the outset of transition reaching extremely high levels especially 
in FSU economies. The adoption of stabilization policies improved significantly 
growth and inflation performance in all transition economies. After two years that 
stabilization programs were introduced, growth experienced a quick rebound and 
inflation rates decreased considerably bouncing back to acceptable levels. By 1996, 
the majority of transition economies started to recover from the transformational 
recession and expanded their growth potential. Growth slowdown was coupled 
with large fiscal deficits which went back to normality after stabilization measures 
were put into action.  
Empirical investigation incorporated all the above mentioned factors into a sin-
gle econometric model including other explanatory variables such as structural pol-
icies and trade distortions to characterize growth dynamics in different economies. 
Results stemming from the estimation of the model revealed that macroeconomic 
policies and reform measures are considered important growth determinants and 
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the speed of reforms positively affects growth rates. The long-run assessment of 
growth performance involves neo-classical growth theory which takes into account 
population growth rates, primary and secondary school enrollment, government 
expenditures, initial GDP per capita, and gross capital formation. This study sug-
gested that policies should be addressed in increasing investment rates and improv-
ing investment efficiency in order to obtain higher growth rates. Also, the role of in-
stitutions and political factors should not be neglected when estimating their long 
term effect on output development (Fischer et. al, 1998).  
Mitrovic & Ivancev (2009) investigated the importance of key growth factors 
during the second part of the transition process and the impact of EU enlargement 
process on output performance. In the empirical work, it was estimated that macro-
economic policies represented by  the fiscal balance, government spending and con-
sumer price index continued to influence growth activities in the later transition 
period. Initial conditions which seemed to be substantial determinants of growth in 
the first transition years have had a diminishing role in the later periods. Structural 
reforms demonstrated a non-linear effect influencing growth positively in the first 
decade of transition followed by a significant negative relationship afterwards. This 
puzzling and ambiguous link between reforms and growth is devoted to the delays 
and stagnation of the reform process in some economies in transition which has 
eventually been harmful to economic progress. European integration has affected 
output performance though its impact has been negative possibly due to the recent 
financial crisis of 2008.  
Firdmuc & Tichit (2009) analyzed different patterns of transition based on the 
existence of structural breaks which emphasize the importance of reform-growth 
linkages. Instead of separating the data in two groups (CEE and FSU countries) as it 
is commonly used in many empirical studies, an alternative methodology that iden-
tifies several structural breaks within the sample is employed. Moreover, progress 
in the reform process and the weights assigned to each component of the index are 
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calculated using component factor analysis. Empirical investigation suggested the 
presence of three structural breaks in the data concerning four important growth 
models that differed across many reform trajectories. It has been estimated that re-
forms have played a substantial positive role on economic growth especially in the 
early reform period.  
The endogeneity among reforms and growth is a problematic issue arising in 
most empirical specifications. In OLS regressions, estimators become biased and 
inconsistent and the use of instrumental variables is necessary to investigate the 
reform-growth nexus. Several authors have recognized the feedback effects of 
growth to reforms. For instance, Campos and Horvath (2012) state that the reform 
is carried out in the expectation that it will translate into faster growth rates, while 
at the same time a growing economy enables a reformist government to compen-
sate losers from reform and thus continue, or even intensify, reforms ( p. 233).  
Krueger and Ciolko (1998) reported that liberalization index is endogenous to 
growth leading to biased estimates. They used a two stage least squares IV estima-
tor and run a Hausman test to detect the presence of endogeneity between liberali-
zation index and output growth. This test implied that liberalization index is endog-
enous to output fluctuations, while inflation is exogenously related to growth.  
 Heybey and Murrell (1999) employed a three stage least squares methodology 
to address the issue of endogeneity of liberalization and growth. The econometric 
results documented the positive and significant impact of growth on the speed of 
reforms finding no statistical significance on the reverse relationship at the initial 
years of transition.  
Mickiewicz (2005) explained the reform-growth nexus in terms of a three stage 
least squares estimation (3SLS) in order to deal with the endogeneity problem in 
the model. Compared to previous studies, the sample of countries considered in the 
estimation was increased and the model accounted for some degree of reform im-
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plementation in some CEE countries before the fall of communism. Moreover, coun-
try fixed effects were entered into regression equations substituting the proxies for 
initial conditions and time trend interactions with the exogenous variables were not 
considered due to the possible correlation with the reforms. One of the most im-
portant conclusions drawn from this study suggests that the inclusion of both con-
temporaneous and lagged reform indicators possibly leads to a spurious relation-
ship among reforms and growth being severely pronounced in longer time periods. 
However, the lagged reform indicator had a positive and statistically significant ef-
fect on economic growth. Other important relationships that emerge from the em-
pirical analysis emphasized the negative impact of political liberties on reforms.  
Eicher & Schreiber (2010) documented the short-term impact of structural poli-
cies on economic growth in a panel of 26 transition economies by conducting a time 
series analysis from 1991- 2001. The endogeneity of structural policies posed seri-
ous issues in the empirical estimation and therefore several approaches were used 
to alleviate this problem. To control for endogeneity, a large panel was considered 
and a GMM estimator which produces unbiased results was used in the estimation. 
Furthermore, political institutions were considered as instruments in the analysis. 
The structural policy index was constructed following EBRD Transition Indicators 
and it was estimated to be statistically significant in all the specifications. A ten per-
cent increase in the structural policy index induced a 2.68% increase in the output 
growth. The positive correlation among polices and growth remained robust in dif-
ferent specifications of the model. An alternative way to assess the relationship 
among structural policies and growth in transition is to focus on the role of political 
institutions. The empirical estimation revealed that the measures which serve as a 
proxy for political institutions indirectly affect output performance by means of 
structural policies.  
Beside structural policies which were introduced at the start of the transition 
and considered as first-phase reforms, a substantial part of economic research has 
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been devoted lately into the study of the impact of institutional reforms (i.e. second-
phase reforms) on economic growth.  
Havrylyshyn and Rooden (2003) tried to construct relevant measures of institu-
tional indicators and tested empirically the contribution of these variables in the 
growth equations of 25 transition economies of Central and Eastern Europe, Baltics, 
Russia and other Former Soviet Union countries. Institutional factors were divided 
in two main categories which included legal and political indicators to assess their 
common and different impact on output growth. Empirical results showed that 
among all the explanatory variables, inflation rate and structural reforms played a 
crucial role in determining the output performance in transition. Reforms positively 
contributed to growth in the long run, despite the initial negative impact which was 
reversed in the later periods. In addition, the role of initial conditions diminished 
over time thus losing its significance in the model. The inclusion of political and le-
gal variables in the growth model suggested that they significantly affected output 
performance in transition countries. Especially, the legal framework positively con-
tributed to growth performance while the impact of political liberties seemed to be 
negatively related to growth when the legal indices were entered in the estimation. 
This result emerged probably due to the high multicollinearity between political 
and legal indices but it might also have an economic interpretation in the context of 
transition.  The negative relationship among the political indices and growth can be 
attributed to a slow pace of reform implementation process sustained by certain 
political forces.  
Reform reversals are an important component of growth empirics and have 
been addressed lately in a number of studies concerning transition economies. 
Merlevede (2003) defines a reform reversal as “a downgrading in the level of aver-




Merlevede (2003) tested the contribution of reform reversals on output perfor-
mance of transition economies using as a reform measure a weighted average of 
several EBRD transition indicators. Results emerging from the empirical analysis 
suggested that the contemporaneous impact of reforms on growth is positive fol-
lowed by a reverse negative relationship. Additionally, reversals are estimated to 
cause a decline in output growth within a short period of time and the severity of 
the slowdown is higher in those economies which have implemented more reforms 
and have high rankings in the reform indices.  
Christiansen et al. (2009) in contrast with other studies which focused only on a 
single reform dimension, considered a broad spectrum of different reform measures 
simultaneously based on a large group of de jure variables mainly in three reform 
areas: finance, trade and capital account. The data sample covered a large panel 
comprising of 90 countries which were divided into low-income, middle-income 
and high-income countries and the period of estimation extended from 1974 to 
2004. Significant attention is paid to modeling the dynamic impact of reforms on 
output growth and the duration of these effects by adding a specification that is de-
signed to capture the cases where reforms exert a positive effect on growth through 
positive changes in the liberalization index and reform reversals which negatively 
impact the liberalization index. The empirical results showed that the component of 
liberalization index concerning domestic financial reforms had positively and signif-
icantly influenced output growth in the whole sample of countries, and particularly 
middle-income countries for a period up to 6 years after reforms were introduced. 
The estimation in the dynamic panel revealed that trade reforms were positively 
associated with economic growth both contemporaneously and in the previous pe-
riod. The positive association between the lead of large reforms and growth indicat-
ed that growth increases whenever reforms are anticipated. On the contrary, reform 
reversals negatively influenced the economic performance by lowering growth.  The 
differences on the impact of reforms between low-income and high income coun-
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tries resulted from the developments of property rights in these countries. Lastly, 
the sequencing of reforms was discussed focusing on the role of political institu-
tions which seem to be an important driver toward pushing growth upwards. 
Campos & Coricelli (2009) explored the linkages between political and financial 
liberalization and reform reversals in a panel setting of 26 transition economies 
from 1989 to 2005. They provided empirical evidence for the U-shaped, non-linear 
relationship among political and economic reforms and constructed relevant indica-
tors of financial and political liberalization. Financial liberalization index included 
several variables which were designed to capture the size and efficiency of the fi-
nancial systems. The political reform index consisted of political rights, civil liber-
ties and democracy variables which were obtained from Freedom House and Na-
tions in Transit reports. A possible explanation for the non-linear association be-
tween democracy and economic reforms is attributed to the role that different polit-
ical and economic elites play in a regime of “partial” or “intermediate” democracy. 
Special considerations were devoted to the study of the ambiguous association of de 
jure and de facto measures of political and financial liberalization. Therefore, the 
role of laws and regulations in affecting the financial systems of transition econo-
mies was further explored and it was found out that changes in laws and regula-
tions provide a remarkable stimulus for financial liberalization to take place. In ad-
dition, the empirical estimations suggested that political reforms exerted a signifi-
cant direct impact on the actual functioning of financial systems in transition.  
Coricelli & Maurel (2011) examined output developments in transition coun-
tries by differentiating periods of output growth and recessions. The switch from 
planned to market economies has been associated initially with a large output de-
cline (a process that is known as “transitional recession”) followed by periods of 
recovery and/or crises influencing different patterns of output paths in transition.  
Comparing the transitional recession among CEE and CIS countries, it is observed 
that the depth and the magnitude of the cumulative loss in output has been larger 
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for CIS countries due to their adverse initial conditions and slow pace of reform im-
plementation. In addition, transitional recession has been estimated to have a nega-
tive long term impact on output growth which was more pronounced in CIS com-
pared to CEE countries, emphasizing once more the capacity of CEE economies to 
recover quickly from the large initial output decline. Focusing on two reform 
measures (i.e. financial and trade liberalization), the empirical investigation was 
extended to account for the impact of reform complementarities on the capacity of 
transition economies to rebound as well as on the length and duration of recessions. 
Results showed that complementarity of reforms didn’t have any impact on the abil-
ity of transition economies to catch-up pre-crises levels of output growth, affecting 
only the length and duration of the crises.  
2.3 Transition strategies and sequencing of reforms  
Sequencing of reforms in transition economies and the optimal speed at which lib-
eralization policies should be implemented constitute a subject of debate among 
economists since at the start of transition.  
The fall of the Berlin Wall and the dismantling of the Soviet Union urged for the 
adoption of several reform strategies which would help to overcome the inherited 
distortions, stabilize the economy and ensure growth. These strategies aimed at 
macroeconomic stabilization, microeconomic restructuring, along with institutional 
and political reforms (Svejnar 2002, p.4).  
Svejnar (2002) identified two main reform packages which were defined as 
Type I and Type II reforms. The first category of reforms (Type I) aimed at macroe-
conomic and microeconomic stabilization of transition economies associated with 
price liberalization and the break up with the old institutions. The macroeconomic 
strategy emphasized restrictive fiscal and monetary policies, wage controls and, in 
most cases, also a fixed exchange rate. The micro strategy was to move quickly to-
ward price liberalization, although a number of key prices, like those of energy, 
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housing and basic consumption goods, often remained controlled along with wages 
and exchange rates (Svejnar, 2002, p. 5). In the light of these new developments, 
transition economies were opened to the world economy, trade  liberalized, capital 
and labor was reallocated to newly established firms, state-owned enterprises en-
gaged in restructuring, and a new banking system was created.  
Type II reforms were concerned with the establishment of a regulatory frame-
work and the creation of new institutions that would facilitate the transition pro-
cess and consolidate democratic rule. These reforms include the privatization of 
large and medium-sized enterprises; establishment and enforcement of a market-
oriented legal system and accompanying institutions; further in-depth development 
of a viable commercial banking sector and the appropriate regulatory infrastruc-
ture; labor market regulations; and institutions related to public unemployment and 
retirement systems (Svejnar, 2002, p. 5).  
 The differences in growth profiles existing among transition countries in the in-
itial years led to the development of two main reform strategies: big bang approach 
(or shock therapy) and gradual reform. Proponents of the big bang strategy argued 
for a rapid introduction of reforms into the economy, while gradualists supported a 
gradual implementation of reforms. Advocates of “shock therapy” believed that 
countries engaging in a process of fast liberalization and privatization were able to 
achieve better growth rates without the need to establish an institutional frame-
work. On the other hand, gradualists suggested a piecemeal approach of reform im-
plementation and claimed that the development of institutions should come along 
with policies or even precede liberalization and privatization measures (Godoy & 
Stiglitz, 2006).  
Havrylyshyn (2007) provided an extensive literature survey on the heated de-
bate between big bangers and gradualists on the speed of liberalization. To capture 
the diversity of reform strategies followed in transition economies, countries were 
grouped according to transition indicators which reflected the progress in reforms 
30 
 
from communism to a market economy. Liberalization steps were not equal in dif-
ferent transition economies. Poland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Slovakia under-
took rapid reform strategies at the wake of transition as indicated by the rapid in-
crease in transition indicators of these economies and continued to maintain a 
steady pace of reforms throughout the entire period. Countries like Croatia, Slove-
nia, and Hungary adopted fewer reforms initially but later on had a catch-up with 
the previous group. Some economies of South Eastern Europe and Commonwealth 
of Independent States followed a big bang strategy in the first place, however the 
reform process stalled in the following periods and these countries had to abandon 
the big bang approach. Conversely, CIS economies supported a gradual liberaliza-
tion process since the start of the transition while countries like Belarus, Uzbekistan 
and Turkmenistan followed a limited number of reforms.  
Some important observations emerge by comparing the speed of structural and 
institutional reforms in different transition economies. The adoption of second-
stage reforms or institutional reforms moved slowly compared to the early liberali-
zation measures in all countries. In addition, countries that followed a big bang ap-
proach benefited more compared to gradualist economies since they had the oppor-
tunity to lay the foundations for the development of an institutional framework. Ev-
idence provided in support of shock therapy strategy showed that countries follow-
ing rapid and extensive reforms achieved a prompt and sustainable recovery. Fur-
thermore, the advanced reformers, contrary to the gradualists’ beliefs experienced 
lower social disparities and income inequalities. Gini coefficients in Central Eastern 
economies had lower values as opposed to CIS economies which experienced large 
income discrepancies ( Havrylyshyn, 2007).  
Barlow & Radulescu (2005) investigated the sequencing of reforms in transition 
economies to evaluate whether progress made in some reform areas has significant-
ly contributed to the development of other reform measures. Out of several reform 
indicators listed in EBRD Transition Report, it emerged that small-scale privatiza-
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tion affected positively and significantly progress made in large-scale privatization, 
trade liberalization and banking reforms. Reforms in the banking industry stimulat-
ed the advances made in the restructuring area. Trade liberalization induced 
growth in the banking reform and small-scale privatization. Large-scale privatiza-
tion did not have any substantial impact in stimulating progress in other reform ar-
eas in transition countries. The division of the sample of countries into FSU and 
non-FSU economies emphasized once more the importance of small-scale privatiza-
tion reforms which were considered to have a significant larger impact on FSU 
economies compared to non-FSU economies. Lastly, negotiations prior to EU acces-
sion didn’t play any role in intensifying the reform agenda of transition economies. 
However, reform efforts were increased after the EU accession with respect to 
banking and competition policy reforms.  
Aristei & Perugini (2011) studied the impact of different reform patterns on the 
income inequality of 27 transition countries from 1989 to 2006. These economies 
were divided into seven clusters allowing for the speed and sequencing of reforms. 
Gini coefficient, which served as a measure of inequality was regressed on its lagged 
values in one period, GDP growth, inflation rate, government spending, industry 
share, a war dummy, an index of reforms and some interactive terms between re-
forms and transition clusters. The empirical estimation using a dynamic panel mod-
el showed that reforms led to large and significant income disparities among transi-
tion economies.  
Staehr (2003) addressed the relative contribution of specific reform measures 
on economic growth, the importance of a good reform strategy that would be bene-
ficial to growth in the short-term and medium-term and the speed at which these 
reforms should be implemented. To minimize the multicollinearity effects between 
individual reforms, principal component analysis was employed to differentiate 
among five clusters of reform indices which were uncorrelated with each other.  
The first principal component captured an ample dimension of reforms consisting 
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of privatization, liberalization and structural policies, while other clusters disentan-
gle the effects of single reform policies on output performance. Implementation of a 
wide spectrum of reforms had positive implications for growth in the medium run, 
contrary to their negative contribution in the early transition period. Moreover, lib-
eralization and small-scale privatization policies were positively related to growth 
in the medium-term. On the other hand, a combination of large scale privatization 
without the presence of small scale privatization, market opening without small-
scale privatization and enterprise restructuring, and at the end bank liberalization 
reforms without enterprise restructuring affected growth negatively. However, the 
speed of reforms did not have any significant impact on growth. As a consequence, 
neither a big-bang approach which emphasizes the importance of fast reform im-
plementation nor a gradualist course provides a precise and comprehensive solu-
tion to modeling the growth strategies in transition economies.  
In contrast to this view, Godoy & Stiglitz (2006) argued that rapid privatization 
in transition economies has been detrimental to output growth in the medium run 
providing more support to gradualists’ approach rather than shock therapy. Propo-
nents of the “shock therapy” suggested that countries engaging in fast liberalization 
and privatization were able to experience large output growth. Opponents of this 
view appealed for a gradual reform strategy due to large transition costs and the 
concentration of power and wealth in the hands of political institutions leading to a 
slowdown of the economy. Another important finding which was emphasized in the 
literature discussed the necessity of legal and regulatory institutions as an im-
portant prerequisite that would improve privatization efforts and economic per-
formance in transition.  
Popov (2007) highlighted a number of factors characterizing growth perfor-
mance in transition economies during the periods of transitional recession and re-
covery. He provided a supply-side explanation for the initial output decline occur-
ring in these economies emphasizing the undisputable detrimental role of large dis-
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tortions inherited from the communist command and the failure of the state institu-
tions to guarantee rule of law and economic stability in the wake of newly estab-
lished democracies. As a matter of fact, reforms did not seem to play an important 
role during recession since they were found to be statistically insignificant in most 
empirical estimations in the absence of accounting of endogeneity. Nevertheless, 
after endogeneity of liberalization index was tested, empirical results confirmed a 
negative and statistically significant impact of reforms on economic growth indicat-
ing that the more liberalized economies experienced sharp output declines. On the 
other hand, the speed of liberalization affected positively growth performance dur-
ing the recovery stage, while the role of initial conditions faded out in the transition 
context. Still, institutional variables and macroeconomic policies continued to be 
important determinants of growth in both periods of transformational recession 
and post-recession recovery.  
Wolf (1997) summarized basic reform strategies adopted in transition econo-
mies and evaluated their contribution on output performance providing evidence 
on a J-curve relationship between the liberalization index and output growth. In 
other terms, contemporaneous liberalization is found to be negatively correlated 
with economic growth rates, while its lagged values are positively associated to 
output growth. When other explanatory variables are added into the model, the lib-
eralization index loses its significance though the signs of the coefficients remain 
the same. Traditional growth factors such as investment rates which are considered 
to be important drivers of output in an economy do not seem to affect growth in 
transition. Such results entail large differences between investment quantity and 
efficiency. “Because transition economies commenced from very high investment 
shares, investment quantities declined toward normal levels in the fastest liberaliz-
ing countries, which arguably also had the largest gains in investment efficiency” (p. 
18). In addition, the speed of liberalization did not have a significant impact on 
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growth performance indicating that the choice of any reform strategy will not de-















Explaining the output decline  
One of the most prominent features of Central Eastern European and ex-Soviet Un-
ion economies was the large initial output decline observed at the beginning of 
transition period. This dramatic fall in output was not anticipated by economists 
since growth rates were underestimated and no transition models were available at 
that time to ensure the rapid and less costly transformation of centrally-planned 
economies into democratic regimes (Svejnar, 2002). Measurement errors in esti-
mating GDP growth rates were related to the exclusion of the new-born private sec-
tor in the official statistics and the expansion of a shadow economy in the early 
years following the fall of communism (Fischer & Sahay, 2000). The largest output 
decline occurred after price liberalization reforms were undertaken in transition 
economies. To mention some examples, Poland introduced price liberalization in 
1990, Russia in 1992 and Ukraine in 1994 (Roland, 2000).  
Kornai (1994) has provided an extensive analysis on the main causes of the 
deep recession that he refers to as “transformational recession” which affected all 
transition economies. First of all, the open-up to a capitalist system was associated 
with a shift from a supply-oriented economy to a demand-driven economy. In addi-
tion, price liberalization process led to a new equilibrium of relative prices and al-
tered the composition of industry production compared to services share. Other fac-
tors which contributed to the transformation of the economy structure were related 
to the transfer of property from the state sector to the private entities followed by 
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restoration of the small and medium-size firms which were completely abolished 
during the communist period. The breakdown of coordination and harmonization of 
economic activities and the lack of market institutions at the outset of transition 
deepened the output decline until new market mechanisms were developed to re-
establish trade relationships. Furthermore, in the short-term privatization efforts 
induced a reduction in output as a result of increasing unemployment and lowering 
demand. However, on the long run transition economies were able to reap the bene-












Macroeconomic Performance  
4.1  Output growth in transition economies 
The shift from a centrally-planned economy to a market-oriented system required 
an important economic transformation and the adjustment of mechanisms that 
would enable the creation of new activities and the allocation of capital and labor to 
the emerging productive sectors of the economy (Fischer & Sahay, 2000). Several 
factors are pointed out in EBRD Transition Report (1999) explaining the massive 
output fall and an abrupt increase in inflation rates at the outset of transition: 
“In the early years of transition, all countries faced rapid inflation and 
falling output due to a combination of factors: the monetary overhang 
from central planning, the erosion of the old (notional) tax base, diffi-
culties in asserting monetary and fiscal control in new economic cir-
cumstances, and disorganization arising from the collapse of a rigid sys-
tem” ( p. 57).  
Growth rates have experienced substantial variations throughout the transition 
period and across diverse regions of the Central Eastern Europe, South Eastern Eu-
rope and Commonwealth of Independent States. The division of countries into three 
distinct groups allows a better comparison of output dynamics among different re-
gions and captures common and different features of these economies. GDP trends 
showing the evolution of output in transition economies from 1989 to 2010 are re-
ported below in Fig. 1.  
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As it can be easily noticed, output has declined in all economies though the mag-
nitude of the decline has been different for CEE, SEE and CIS countries. The largest 
output decline is observed in CIS economies, followed by SEE and CEE countries. CIS 
countries hit the bottom by 1992 with real growth rates plunging to almost 20%. In 
addition, SEE economies experienced more contained output fall compared to CIS, 
where the trough was estimated to be approximately 15% of the real GDP growth. 
Lastly, CEE countries were the least exposed to the “transitional recession” phe-
nomena as their output dropped to a slightly higher level of 10%.  
 
Figure 4.1  Source: Author’s calculations using World Bank data 
Another particular characteristics of the growth performance in transition 
which can be seen in  Fig.4.1 concerns output recovery. Economies of Central East-
ern Europe had the capacity to quickly overcome the massive output fall at the start 
of transition, while CIS economies had a more prolonged period of recession. The 
more pronounced is transitional recession, the larger are the capacities of the econ-
omy to rebound and achieve rapid growth. Average growth rates in those econo-
mies which experienced protracted and profound recessions are estimated to be 




The recovery period for Central Eastern and South Eastern Economies started 
earlier compared to the CIS countries between 1992-1994. In the meantime, CIS 
economies continued to experience a sustained period of downturn. (Havrylyshyn 
2008). By 2000 and afterwards, CIS economies outpaced CEE growth rates signifi-
cantly in a puzzling manner despite their backwardness in structural and institu-
tional reforms. Some of the factors attributable to the rapid growth in CIS countries 
were dependent on sound macroeconomic policies reflected in declining inflation 
rates in a great part of the region and an improved fiscal balance of these econo-
mies. It was estimated that the average fiscal deficit narrowed from about six per-
cent of GDP in 1996–2000 to one percent in 2001–06 (Iradian 2007, p. 5).  
Other important growth determinants in CIS economies were large remittances’ 
transfers, an increase in FDI rates and a surge in commodity prices especially in the 
oil and gas industry. EBRD (2004) Transition Report indicates a high degree of cor-
relation among oil prices in CIS and average growth rates. Oil-rich countries like 
Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Russia, and Turkmenistan took advantage of the boost in 
commodity prices by increasing their exports and fostering growth (Havrylyshyn, 
2008; Iradian 2007). On the other hand, oil-importing CIS economies were damaged 
by the increase of oil prices (Falcetti et.al 2006).  
Lastly, devaluation of domestic currencies against the ruble following the Rus-
sian crisis in 1998 resulted in an increase of the domestic demand in the Russian 
economy. Therefore, CIS economies benefited from the import-substitution effects 
concerning Russian markets and expanded their exports which turned out to have 
positively contributed on growth ( Havrylyshyn 2008; Loukoianova & Unigovskaya 
2004).  
One of the most important challenges of resource-rich CIS economies depends 
on the ability to diversify investment opportunities in other sectors of the economy. 
An excessive dependence on the commodity-based industry produces adverse ef-
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fects that contribute to a slowdown in output performance in the long run. Growing 
exports of commodity goods such as oil, gas, minerals, etc. can lead to an apprecia-
tion of the domestic currency which in turn reduces competition in other industry 
sectors such as manufacturing (Iradian, 2007). Furthermore, the economy becomes 
more exposed to exchange rate volatility of commodity prices having a negative im-
pact on the fiscal balance (EBRD Transition Report, 2003).  
4.2 Fiscal Balance  
Transition economies have experienced large fiscal imbalances following a U-
shaped pattern and being particularly pronounced in CIS economies. Similar to the 
output paths at the outset of the transition period, all economies of CEE, SEE and CIS 
coped with deep fiscal deficits as it is depicted in Fig. 4.2  CEE and SEE economies 
faced smooth fiscal contractions after the break-up with the communist legacy es-
timated between 5-10% of GDP. Conversely, CIS economies encountered a sharp 
fiscal tightening reaching more than 15% of the GDP level.  
“At the start of transition, fiscal imbalances quickly emerged as a key challenge 
to macroeconomic stabilization, and were an inevitable result of lost revenues for 
transfer-dependent states of the former Soviet Union, the general collapse in in-
comes with concomitant loss in revenues, and additional demands for expendi-
tures” ( Alam & Sundberg, 2002, p.1). Initially, fiscal deficits were associated with 
high inflation rates and were seen as a source of macroeconomic instability. In addi-
tion, they produce negative consequences for the growth prospects in the long-run 
due to high borrowing costs needed to finance expenditures (EBRD Transition Re-
port, 1998; 2000).  
One of the main sources of the large fiscal imbalances present in CIS economies 
was attributed to the decline in revenues as a result of the break-up with the Soviet 
Union which translated into substantial fiscal losses (Alam & Sundberg, 2002).  By 
1999, government revenues accounted for a smaller share of GDP in CIS with aver-
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age rates of 24% of GDP, while in CEE economies the average share of government 
revenues was estimated to be 40% of GDP (EBRD Transition Report, 2000). 
 
Figure 4.2 Source: Author’s calculations using EBRD data 
The disintegration of the Soviet Union was coupled with the creation of new 
member states which required independent and efficient tax-collection institutions 
to increase revenues. This process required the transformation of the tax admin-
istration shifting from turnover taxes collected from the state sector enterprises to 
personal income taxes and VAT coming from the private entities.  There exists a 
huge discrepancy in the functioning of the tax system and tax collection rates in 
economies of Central Eastern Europe and Former Soviet Union states. Tax collection 
rates were higher in CEE economies compared to CIS economies. For instance, in 
countries like Croatia, Hungary, Latvia, Poland, Slovenia, and Slovakia tax to GDP 
ratios was estimated to be around 40-50% by 2000 ( Alam & Sundberg, 2002).  
In CIS economies, tax collection was problematic as a consequence of tax evasion 
concerns reinforced by the existence of a large informal economy and barter trans-
actions as a medium of exchange ( EBRD Transition Report, 1998; 1999). Revenue 
collection through direct taxation of profits, personal income and social contribu-
42 
 
tions was higher in CEE countries with an average of 22% in comparison to CIS 
were it was estimated to be only 6% of GDP ( EBRD Transition Report, 2000).   
An important feature characterizing all transition economies with respect to 
their fiscal positions concerned their very high levels of government expenditure. 
Central and Eastern European countries maintained balanced budget deficits fi-
nanced primarily through tax increases, while CIS economies had to reduce their 
government expenditures significantly (Pirttilä, 2001). Between 1992 and 2000, the 
average reduction in expenditures in CIS countries was 23.1 percent of GDP as 
compared to 5.6 percent in the CEB countries (Alam & Sundberg, 2002, p.4).   
The Russian crisis of 1998 represents a turning point for the fiscal performance 
of CIS economies which experienced sharp increases in the fiscal balance leaving 
behind SEE and CEE economies. Most of improvements in the fiscal position are de-
pendent on the surge in the commodity prices which constitute a major source of 
revenues for oil-rich CIS economies. In order to sustain growing revenues coming 
from exploitation of natural resources and to insulate these economies from the ex-
change rate volatility, countries like Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan have created the so-
called stabilization funds. These funds ensure short-term stabilization and long-
term saving operations. The first task concerns risk mitigation stemming from ex-
change rate fluctuations by transfering commodity funds from the government’s 
authorities under the stabilization funds’ supervision and management. The sav-
ings’ duty handles the allocation of the revenues and investments into diversified 
sectors of the economy.  (EBRD Transition Report 2003). 
4.3 Main reform policies and progress in transition 
The fall of the communist legacy and the establishment of new democratic regimes 
was associated with a huge transformation of the political and economic systems in 
transition economies of the Central Eastern Europe and Former Soviet Union. Dis-
mantling of the old socialist institutions and the opening up to the world economy, 
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allowing the existence of free markets and private enterprises required the adop-
tion of radical reforms into major sectors of the economy. Initial conditions of re-
forms have not been the same in transition economies as some of them had previ-
ously experienced a certain degree of liberalization and had started to implement 
gradually a number of economic reforms in the pre-transition period. This factor 
had a substantial impact in highlighting the diverse growth experiences of Central 
and South Eastern and Commonwealth of Independent States throughout the transi-
tion process.  
The pattern of reforms for economies of CEE, SEE and CIS in calendar time since 
the start of the transition period is presented below in Fig.4.3. The progress in re-
forms is expressed in the vertical axis by means of the EBRD Transition Indices.  
 
Figure 4.3 Source: Author’s calculations using EBRD data 
From the graph, we notice that the transition economies have experienced di-
verse reforms’ path and the Central Eastern European economies are considered to 
be the fastest growing reformers. In the second place, we observe South Eastern Eu-
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ropean economies which have made substantial improvements in their reform 
scores followed by CIS economies.  
EBRD Transition Report (2007) distinguishes among three categories of re-
forms implemented in different transition economies:  
1. First-phase reforms (“market-enabling” reforms) including small-scale pri-
vatization, price liberalization, trade and foreign exchange. 
2. Second-phase reforms (“market-deepening” reforms) referring to large-scale 
privatization and financial sector reforms. 
3. Third-phase reforms (“market-sustaining” reforms) consisting of govern-
ance and enterprise restructuring, competition policy and infrastructure re-
forms.   
Price and trade reforms provide a range of benefits in transition economies be-
cause they ensure an adjustment of prices through competition and opening up of 
the markets with the world economies (Fischer & Gelb, 1991). Liberalization of 
prices, trade and foreign exchange were at the heart of economic transformation in 
the early transition process in most countries. Czech Republic, Poland, Hungary, Es-
tonia but also Albania, Macedonia, Kyrgyzstan and Moldova were among the first to 
liberalize prices, trade and domestic markets. The rest of the countries, especially 
those located in the CIS and SEE region faced more difficulties in the adoption and 
sustainability of these reforms. For instance, Bulgaria and Russia tried to liberalize 
their internal and external markets but did not succeed in this direction because 
they stepped back in the reform process. Nevertheless, Russia achieved to a large 
extent liberalization of domestic and foreign trade by 1999 (EBRD Transition Re-
port, 2000). Progress in liberalization policies has been influenced by the necessity 
to become part of the important international organizations such as the World 
Trade Organization and the European Union (EBRD Transition Report, 1998; 2000). 
However, most of EBRD economies have successfully completed the initial-phase 
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reforms leaving behind only a few countries like Belarus and Turkmenistan (ERBD 
Transition Report, 2002; 2003).  
The adoption of a fixed or floating exchange rate was an important component 
of the stabilization programme at the start of the transition. Central Eastern Euro-
pean economies and some Baltic states like Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, Estonia and 
Croatia adopted a fixed exchange rate regime while some South Eastern European 
(i.e Albania, Bulgaria, Macedonia, etc.) economies opted for a floating exchange rate 
system together with Former Soviet Union countries. Nowadays, almost all transi-
tion economies have endorsed flexible exchange rates. Poland introduced a flexible 
exchange rate system by 1995 and Slovakia in 1998 (Fischer & Sahay, 2000).  
The reform process in some countries stalled as a result of internal conflicts, po-
litical instability and wars. Former Yugoslavia experienced adverse effects as a re-
sult of the ongoing conflict with Kosovo. Its economy underwent through many 
trade restrictions, price controls, bankruptcy and insolvency problems. Bosnia and 
Herzegovina followed the same course of Former Yugoslavia as it had to recover 
from war which caused many human losses and economic problems. Tajikistan en-
countered political unrest and civil wars which contributed to a slowdown in the 
reform implementation in key sectors of the economy (EBRD Transition Report, 
2001).  
Privatization of state enterprises was another important priority in the reform 
agenda of transition economies. It constituted an important pillar of the transfor-
mation of socialist economies into market economies. Small-scale privatization has 
been achieved in most transition economies in the first decade of transition. Central 
Eastern European economies represented the most successful cases of privatiza-
tion, while CIS economies lagged behind.   
Economies of CEE, SEE and CIS followed different privatization strategies at the 
beginning of transition. The choice of a specific privatization method is complex and 
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does not involve simply the transfer of ownership from state enterprises to private 
firms, but affects also macroeconomic performance indicators, the financial, politi-
cal and institutional stability of an economy. Initially, the first step toward privatiza-
tion concerned the so-called “commercialization” process where the state-owned 
enterprises had gained a certain degree of independence (Roland, 2000; Svejnar, 
2002). Poland and Slovenia followed a slow path of privatization, while Estonia and 
Hungary moved faster by privatizing their state-owned enterprises and selling them 
to foreigners. Russia and Ukraine chose mass-privatization through management-
employee buyouts but in the end this method was proven to be not very effective 
since it provided less government revenues. Czech Republic and Slovakia undertook 
an equal-access voucher privatization (Svejnar, 2002). CIS economies hesitated to 
privatize in a rapid fashion due to the long dominance of communism and little ac-
cess to market economies (Lieberman & Kopf, 2008).  
By 2004, most of the transition progress has been achieved in South Eastern Eu-
ropean economies explained in part by the aspiration of EU membership. Hence, 
Romania and Bulgaria undertook rapid reforms in large-scale privatization, banking 
sector and infrastructure. Croatia moved forward in terms of governance, banking 
and infrastructure reform. Economies of the Central Europe made significant im-
provements in key reform areas. On the other hand, reform progress was estimated 
to be relatively small in CIS economies. Only, Kyrgyz Republic made significant steps 
forward in the large-scale privatization and infrastructure reforms (EBRD Transi-
tion Report, 2004).  
In conclusion, the future challenges for EBRD economies rests in the accom-
plishment of the third-phase reforms in the areas of governance and enterprise re-








This study attempts to investigate the relationship between reforms and growth in 
Central Eastern Europe, South Eastern Europe and Commonwealth of Independent 
States from 1989 until 2010. The fall of the Berlin Wall and the break-up of the So-
viet Union provide a unique set-up for the examination of the diverse growth expe-
riences of transition economies driven by many factors which are widely discussed 
in the theoretical and empirical literature.  
  Inspired by the work of Merlevede (2003), Falcetti et. al (2002), Falcetti et. 
al (2006), we aim to study the reform-growth nexus in a panel data framework ex-
tending the period of study in the latest years. CEE and SEE economies have made 
considerable improvements in their key reform indicators, while in CIS economies 
this process has been slowed down, stucked, and even reversed. Since the reforms 
process has been non-uniform and characterized by many humps and slumps in two 
decades of transition, it is of extreme interest for us to understand the mechanisms 
of transmission of reforms to growth.  Beside the reform progress measured by 
EBRD Transition indicators, we tackle the role of reforms reversals and their conse-
quences on output growth.  Hence, the following hypotheses will be tested in the 
empirical study:  
1. The contemporaneous impact of reforms on economic growth is negative, 




2. The greater is the magnitude of the reversal (downgrade of the reform in-
dex), the larger is its impact on economic growth. 
3. The negative impact of a reversal on growth is bigger whenever a country 
has achieved a higher score in the reform index.  
Macroeconomic stabilization policies represented by the fiscal balance are sta-














Methodology and empirical results 
6.1  Data  and methodology shortcomings 
Our dataset consists of seven economies of Central Eastern Europe, five economies 
of South Eastern Europe and twelve CIS countries. Data sources come from interna-
tional organizations like World Bank, EBRD and from De Melo et. al (2001) which 
has compiled a large set of initial conditions that we use in our empirical estimation.  
However, there exist some deficiencies associated with the construction of the data 
and their sources. We are going to address briefly some of these concerns in order 
to take stock later on for further improvements.   
    First, at the start of the transition, output growth was largely underestimated 
due to the creation of private enterprises which were working in a shadow econo-
my (Falcetti et. al 2002; Falcetti et. al, 2006). Hence, empirical estimates based on 
these statistics are not fully accurate. This fact is reported in EBRD Transition Re-
port (2004) which argues that “empirical research in transition economies is ham-
pered by the poor quality of the data in many countries” (p. 13).  
 Second, reform indicators made available from the European Bank for Re-
construction and Development (EBRD) which take values from “ 1” to “ 4+” reflect-
ing the shift from a closed economy to a market-oriented economy  are highly sub-
jective,  thus less reliable .  
Campos & Horvath (2012) have identified several drawbacks of the reform indi-
ces presented by EBRD.  Primarily, these indices do not provide detailed infor-
mation about the underlying variables and the ways they are incorporated into the-
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se indices. Furthermore, they do not make any distinction between policy inputs 
and outcomes. In some cases, there have been some changes in the reform scores 
which have caused perverse empirical results. At last, reform scores are compared 
with an “imprecisely defined reference point” reflecting the ordinal nature of re-
form indicators ( p. 229). That is why Campos & Horvath (2012) create their own 
reform indicators emphasizing the above mentioned problems. In addition, Falcetti 
et. al (2006) argues that there is a distinction between reforms implemented and 
the transition progress shown in the EBRD indices, since the former are not imme-
diately incorporated into the indices. 
6.2  Methodology 
The aim of the thesis is to evaluate the impact of reforms on economic growth in 24 
transition countries. A panel data analysis will be employed to investigate the re-
form˗growth relationship1. For this purpose, the following regression specifications 
will be considered: 
         +   +    +    
 +      +      +        +      +                                               (1) 
        +   +    +    
 +      +      +        +                +      +                  (2)                                                                                                 
        +   +    +    
 +      +      +        +                     +      +         (3)                                                                            
where     is the real GDP growth.     is the overall reform indicator and is calculat-
ed as an equally-weighted average of eight transition indicators, covering  different 
areas of reforms such as: large scale privatization, small scale privatization, enter-
prise restructuring, price liberalization, trade and forex system, competition policy, 
banking reforms and interest rate liberalization, securities markets and non-bank 
financial institutions.2            is an indicator function which takes on the value 1 if 
                                                             
1
 We have tried to use two-stageleast squares, three-stage least squares and dynamic panel methodology 
but obtained perverse results ( R-squared was negative).  
2




     0 and zero otherwise.                0 represents a reform reversal or 
a decrease in the overall reform indicator.    is the initial conditions cluster, respec-
tively, the first principal component used by De Melo et al. (2001).3 The importance 
of the initial conditions in explaining economic growth is found to be reduced over 
time (Merlevede, 2003). For this reason, time multiplying the initial condition (   ) 
enters the regression equation, instead of just the initial condition (  ) itself.      
denotes the macroeconomic stabilization variable and different authors make use of 
either the inflation rate or the fiscal balance. Because the fiscal balance yields better 
econometric results (Merlevede, 2003) we will use it as a measure of macroeco-
nomic stabilization. Since growth and reforms follow a similar time pattern, we 
have included a quadratic time trend in order to avoid spurious regression results. 
 The first equation measures the impact of reforms, both contemporaneous and 
lagged, on economic growth. The contemporaneous impact is expected to be nega-
tive (   0) due to adjustment costs (see e.g. Merlevede, 2003), while the lagged 
effect is expected to be positive (   0). In addition, the second and the third equa-
tions measure the effect of a reform reversal on growth. Specifically, the second re-
gression measures the effect of a reversal on growth, conditional on the magnitude 
of the reversal (i.e. the greater the reversal the greater the impact on growth). 
Whereas in the third equation the effect of the reversal is conditioned on both the 
magnitude of the reversal and the level of the reform indicator the previous period 
(i.e. the impact of the reversal is bigger if the country has a higher level of reform 
indicator). Thus we expect an    parameter greater than zero in both cases.  
We will estimate both a fixed and a random effects model for each regression 
equation given above.4 The former treats the countries specific effects   ’s as fixed 
parameters to be estimated, while the latter treats   ’s as random. To choose be-
                                                             
3
 The first principal component is interpreted as the degree of macroeconomic distortions and unfamiliar-
ity with the market processes at the beginning of transition. 
4
To get the model’s parameters in the fixed effects model we will employ the least squares dummy varia-
ble estimator (or otherwise known as the within estimator). 
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tween the fixed and the random effects model we will employ the Hausman test. 
The Hausman test assumes that the explanatory variables are uncorrelated with the 
disturbances. It is applied in the framework of random effects models, because one 
of the assumptions of random effects model is that explanatory variables are uncor-
related with the disturbances. Possible correlation could lead to inconsistency of 
most of estimators. The general form of the test is as follows: 
  :   ( 
  )  0 
  :   ( 
  )  0 
               
 
                      
  
                 
  
where    is the number of regressors in the within regression. 
4.3  Data and empirical results 
Our dataset is composed of 528 observations which include 24 cross-sectional units 
(i.e. countries) and 22 time series observations for each cross-section. The time se-
ries dimension covers the 1989-2010 period. Transition countries are divided in 
three categories as below: 



























Table 6.1  Transition countries 
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Transition indicators and fiscal balance are retrieved from the European Bank 
for Reconstruction and Development5 (EBRD), real GDP growth rates are retrieved 
from the World Bank6 (WB) and the initial conditions cluster is taken from De Melo 
et al. (2001). Table 4.1 below provides a summary statistics of the data used. 
                                              
Mean 1.781 2.608 -3.544 -0.0039 -0.0094 
Minimum -44.9 1 -54.7 -0.459 -1.414 
Maximum 34.5 4 25.5 0 0 
Std. Dev. 8.858 0.877 5.833 0.027 0.073 
Skewness -1.274 -0.457 -1.899 -11.683 -14.925 
Kurtosis 3.602 -0.92 15.051 170.91 268.95 
       Table 6.2  Summary statistics 
Table 4.2 presents the regression results. Using Hausman test, in all the regres-
sions, we strongly reject the null hypotheses that the GLS estimates are consistent 
with a p-value of zero. Thus, the fixed effects model is preferred to the random ef-
fects model. We observe a negative but statistically insignificant contemporaneous 
effect of reforms on growth.  While the lagged effect is found to be positive and sta-
tistically significant at the 5% significance level. The magnitude of the coefficients 
does not differ much through the regressions. This is consistent with the empirical 
results found in the literature. The estimated parameter    in the second regression 
which measures the impact of a revesal (              ) on growth is found to be pos-
itive (the value of 2.868 in the FE model). This implies that the reversal has a nega-
tive impact on growth and the larger the reversal, the bigger is its impact. Also,    
parameter which corresponds to the                    term in the third regression is 
found to be positive, meaning that the higher the overall reform indicator of a coun-
try is, growth is influenced more adversely when a reversal occurs. Nevertheless, 






we cannot draw firm conclusions because    parameter in both second and third 
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The departure from the communist legacy of transition countries  at the beginning 
of the 90’s was considered an important  moment in the modern history associated 
with abrupt changes in the political and economic systems and the creation of new-
market economies. Central Eastern European countries, South Eastern European 
and Commonwealth of Independent States faced different economic parameters in 
the pre-transition period accentuated even more after the fall of the socialist re-
gime. They had different starting positions in terms of their output growth, reforms, 
unemployment, institutional development, etc. The speed of reforms and the choice 
of a particular transition strategy was a major concern among economists and poli-
ticians and it was a major source of debate which continues still lately.  
This thesis has investigated the reform-growth nexus in 24 economies of the Central 
Eastern Europe, South Eastern Europe and Commonwealth of Independent States. 
Using a panel data methodology, we explored the impact of transition progress 
measured by the transition indices as well as the role of reform reversals on output 
dynamics in the sample of countries. Also, we accounted in our empirical model for 
other explanatory variables such as initial conditions and fiscal balance as a stabili-
zation measure.  
First, we found out a negative contemporaneous relationship among reforms 
and growth followed by a positive lagged effect in the latter periods. This finding is 
consistent with the works of Merlevede (2003), Falcetti et. al (2002), Falcetti et. al 
(2006), Heybey and Murell ( 1999) , etc. Second, we conclude that the larger the 
magnitude of reform reversals, the larger is its impact on output growth, though 
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they are not found to be statistically significant in our model. Third, we report that 
the negative impact of a reversal on growth is bigger whenever a country has 
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